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INTERNATIONAL PATENT COOPERATION:
THE NEXT STEP
Patents' have assumed a fundamental role in encouraging inno-
vation and invention in today's technologically oriented world. By
granting inventors the exclusive right to exploit their inventions, pat-
ents provide a strong economic incentive for private innovation.2
Additionally, by requiring disclosure of inventions, patents facilitate
further innovation by others.3 Society ultimately benefits from the
resulting competition for technological superiority. 4
1. A patent is "[a] grant made by [a] government to an inventor, conveying and
securing to him the exclusive right to make, use and sell his invention for a term of
years." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). In return for this grant, the
inventor fully discloses his invention and makes it available to the public.
In the United States, a patent is represented by a document. The document is usually
written by the inventor, or his agent, and is approved by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. It consists of three main sections: an abstract briefly describing the
invention; a specification describing in detail the form and operation of the inventor's
best embodiment of the invention; and a description delineating in precise terms the
invention's scope and function. For a minimal fee, anyone may obtain a copy of a U.S.
patent from the Patent and Trademark Office. Cf P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDA-
MENTALS A-3 to A-7 app. (1982) (reprint of a U.S. patent).
2. The basic purpose of a nation's patent system is to improve the level of techno-
logical development within that nation. A patent system accomplishes this goal by creat-
ing economic and psychological incentives for inventors to invent and disclose their
inventions. Economically, a patent represents a potentially valuable monopoly. The
prospect of obtaining a patent and the resulting monopoly encourages inventors to spend
the money required to research, develop and commercialize new ideas. A patent insures
a return on the investment. See Tegtmeyer, The Patent Cooperation Treaty, 42 Miss. L.J.
160, 160 (1971). Psychologically, a patent represents a personal achievement. It is a
feather in the inventor's cap, bringing attention and respect from his peers.
3. Governments publish patents and make them easily accessible to the public. See,
e.g., 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-1.13 (The United States requires patent files to be open to the
public). The published patents contain detailed specifications fully describing the inven-
tor's best embodiment of his invention at the time of filing. See, e.g., id The United
States requires the specifications to be so complete, clear and concise that anyone skilled
in the relevant branch of engineering could make and use the invention by following
them. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). Competitors use the specifications as reliable sources of
technical knowledge from which they can create new and better inventions. These subse-
quent inventions are then patented and provide a new basis for further development by
others. Thus, a patent system transforms traditional price competition into a competition
for technological superiority. See Beier, The Significance of the Patent Systemfor Techni-
cal, Economic and Social Progress, I I INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 563,
570-75 (1980). Cf D. SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH 19 (1975) (Drug companies view research and development expenditures for
patentable products as a profitable application of capital funds; thus, the focus of compe-
tition among drug companies is the development of new drugs).
4. See Tegtmeyer, supra note 2, at 160.
230 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:229
To maximize profits from patented inventions, manufacturing
enterprises attempt to lower their manufacturing costs and expand
their markets. To help achieve these goals, many corporations are
establishing multinational production facilities and sales networks. 5
These new undertakings are making it increasingly necessary to
secure adequate patent protection in several countries. 6 Despite this
need, existing methods for obtaining multinational patent protection
are expensive and inefficient. Large scale international attempts to
improve the situation have provided little assistance,7 and regional
cooperative efforts have met with only limited success. 8
This Note examines past and present attempts at international
patent cooperation and concludes that the wide variations existing
among national patent laws pose a major obstacle to more effective
multinational patent cooperation. 9 The Note proposes a technique
for achieving partial patent law unification, while maximizing the
benefit to inventors, and without unduly deviating from national
laws.l 0 The Note also illustrates the application of this technique to
a few areas of patent law that might be addressed by a new treaty
aimed at securing greater international patent cooperation."
5. See S. ROBOCK & K. SIMMONDS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES 6-8 (1973).
6. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 40-56, 131-51 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 57-130 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 200-72 and accompanying text.
The following glossary should assist readers who are unfamiliar with patent
terminology.
Compulsory license: A license that a nation requires a patentee to grant to an inter-
ested party. The conditions that trigger a compulsory license directive differ for various
nations. Some common pre-conditions include the failure of a patentee to work his pat-
ent, the necessity of disclosure because the patent covers subject matter of vital national
importance, and the inability of a third person to work his own patent without such a
license. See infra notes 244-67 and accompanying text. Compulsory licenses are usually
non-exclusive. See 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE,
125-32.1 (1982) (survey of selected compulsory licensing laws).
Interference: A proceeding, initiated by a patent office, to determine who will be
awarded a patent when two or more applicants seek a patent for the same invention. See
P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at §§ 10.01-10.2, at 10-1 to 10-54. In the United States, the
applicant who first conceived of the invention, reduced it to practice, and exercised due
diligence during this period, will be granted the patent. Id at 10-2 to 10-3. Only nations
that follow a first-to-invent priority rule need interference proceedings. For a discussion
of the first-to-invent rule, see infra note 213 and accompanying text.
License: The transfer to another individual or entity of at least a portion of the rights
an inventor secured under his patent. Licenses may be exclusive or non-exclusive.
Under an exclusive license, a patentee surrenders all rights to make, use or sell his inven-
tion; under a non-exclusive license, a patentee retains some of these rights. Ordinarily,
the rights retained by the patentee under a non-exclusive license include the right to
grant additional non-exclusive licenses to other parties. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1,
at § 16.01(b), at 16-9 to 16-11.
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I
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PATENT
COOPERATION
Although patents and patent laws exist in most nations of the
world,' 2 they secure rights which are basically territorial in nature.
The exclusive rights conveyed by a patent, including, for example,
the exclusive right to make, use or sell the patented invention, are
Novelty: Newness. An invention must be novel to be patentable. See P. ROSENBERG,
supra note I, at 7-1 to 7-2. In the United States, one factor negating a finding of novelty
is either the prior use or knowledge of the invention within the United States. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1976). Thus, the United States has a domestic novelty standard; only evidence
of domestic use or knowledge precludes a patent award. In other nations, prior use or
knowledge of the invention anywhere in the world will negate a finding of novelty.
These nations adopt an absolute novelty standard. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at
§ 7.01, at 7-5.
Prior Art: All publicly available information in the relevant scientific discipline to
which an inventor has access. This information may be found in issued patents, pub-
lished papers, textbooks, or any other source that is generally available to the public. See
id at § 7.01, at 7-3 to 7-4. In the United States, the law conclusively presumes that
inventors know the entire body of prior art related to their inventions. See id at § 7.01.
Priority Date: The date beyond which a new publication describing an invention or
rendering it obvious will not preclude patentability. 3 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 14.0512]
(1982). Most nations recognize the patent application filing date as the priority date.
Under the Paris Convention, filing an application in any member nation fixes the priority
date for all member nations. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
Priority of Invention: The first of two or more inventors to conceive, develop, and
reduce an invention to practice has priority in securing a patent for that invention. Cf. 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976) (method of determining who will be awarded a patent).
Priority Period: The period between the priority date and the date a patent is issued.
Once an inventor's priority period begins, new technology or published references cannot
negate the patentability of his invention. In effect, for the purpose of the inventor's
application, the state of the art is frozen during the priority period.
Prosecution ofPatents: The area of patent law practice that deals with the procedural
steps necessary for securing a patent. The prosecution of a patent begins with the filing
of a patent application and ends when a patent is finally issued. P. ROSENBERG, supra
note I, at v-I.
Public Use Grace Period: The period during which an inventor may publicly use his
invention without affecting the invention's patentability. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976)
(Public exposure of an invention more than one year before filing date precludes patent
issuance). Absent this grace period, test marketing or exhibiting an invention at a trade
show, before filing a patent application, would preclude a determination of novelty.
Search: The patent office's examination of the prior art for references negating novelty
or rendering an invention obvious. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 15.03(1), at 15-20 to
15.22.1.
Supranational Patent: A patent that has effect in more than one nation.
Validity: The propriety of a patent grant. A patent that is issued erroneously is invalid
and unenforceable. A patent may be erroneously issued when the law on patentability is
misconceived or an examiner overlooks relevant prior art. See P. ROSENBERG, supra
note 1, at § 17.05, at 17-24 to 17-27.
Working: Using the exclusive rights granted under a patent. Many nations require
patentees to work their patents within that nation during a specified time period. See
infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text. The United States, however, does not require
a patent to be worked. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note I, at § 16.03(4), at 16-34.
12. Baxter found that 169 out of the 198 nations and territories he studied had patent
laws. See 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTr, supra note 11, at xvii-xix, xxi-xxii.
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valid only within the territory of the grantor nation.13 This limited
territorial protection fails to meet the needs of today's increasingly
international industrial environment. Because increasing research
and development costs narrow profit margins, an inventor can often
justify incurring these costs only if he can be assured access to sev-
eral national markets.' 4 Further, inventors need access to multina-
tional patent literature to keep abreast of new technology.' 5 These
factors are making an international approach to patents increasingly
necessary.
Until recently, an inventor desiring multinational patent protec-
tion had to apply separately to the patent office of each target
nation.' 6 Because each nation's patent office performs its own proce-
dural and substantive review,' 7 separate filing results in a multiplic-
ity of effort on the part of the applicant. Additionally, because
variations in national criteria for the grant of a patent exist,' 8
separate filing may force an inventor to file applications in many
nations before he can adequately assess the commercial viability of
his invention. 19 Thus, an inventor can incur substantial translation
and prosecution costs for a merely speculative benefit.
Once multiple patents are issued, the inventor must deal with
different and sometimes conflicting laws regarding the rights and
duties accompanying them. Differences in the types of claims
allowed20 and the scope of protection afforded by granting nations2'
13. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 18.01, at 18-2. A few nations, however, have
formed small patent communities; a patent granted by one community nation is valid in
all other community nations. A patent granted in Switzerland, for example, is valid in
Liechtenstein, and vice-versa. See 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOrr, supra note I1, at xix-xxi.
14. This problem is especially acute in the pharmaceutical field. Stricter regulatory
control has recently combined with other factors to greatly increase the costs of research
and development. D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 3, at 48-49. The expected rate of
return on research investment dropped from approximately eleven percent in 1960 to
between three and five percent in 1973. Id at 36, 44.
15. Cf. Meller, The World-Wide Scope ofPatenting, 2 PRAc. APPROACH TO PATS.,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 1, 3 (1981) (Approximately forty percent of all patent
applications currently filed in the United States are of foreign origin; the information
contained in these foreign applications is available to United States inventors).
16. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 19.01, at 19-2.
17. Id at § 19.01, at 19-4 to 19-9.
18. Id at 19-2.
19. An idea must be novel to be patentable. Different nations, however, define nov-
elty differently. In the United States, for example, a delay in filing of up to one year from
first public disclosure will not preclude novelty status. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). The
inventor can use the one year grace period to test market his invention. Austria, how-
ever, allows only a three month grace period. W. LANG, FOREIGN PATENT LAWS 24
(1968). Texts on international patent practice recommend filing patent applications in all
target nations before any public disclosure is made. See, e.g., id at 25. For a definition
of grace period, see supra note 11.
20. An invention that is described as a "product" in one nation, for example, may
have to be described in terms of a "process" in another nation for the purpose of securing
a patent. The availability of patent protection may differ depending on the invention's
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may result in only partially overlapping patent protection. This
incomplete multinational protection, together with other differences
in nations' substantive laws, 22 may severely complicate an inventor's
worldwide manufacturing and marketing strategy.
In addition to imposing burdens on inventors, the limitations
inherent in the current international patent system tax society as a
whole. By performing their own searches and evaluations, the
national patent offices incur tremendous duplication of effort and
divert the large number of educated people they employ to perform
examinations23 from innovative pursuits of their own.
The several international patent agreements concluded to date
alleviate the above problems, but do not eliminate them. The most
widely accepted agreement, the Paris Convention,24 establishes a
twelve-month priority period 25 among its eighty-eight member
nations26 during which technological development by others will not
affect patentability. This period effectively gives inventors a year in
which to decide whether to apply for patents in member nations.27 A
more recent agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),28
classification. Compare, e.g., The Patents Law, 5727-1967, §§ 3, 7, reprinted in 2E J.
SINNOTTF, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE at Israel 3-4 (1982) (permitting patenta-
bility of chemicals and foods as products) with Law on Inventive Activity of October 19,
1972, § 12, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra, at Poland 4 (1982) (permitting patentability
of chemicals and foods only if framed in terms of processes).
21. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
22. See Note, International Patent Cooperation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1000, 1002-04
(1968).
23. The United States Patent and Trademark Office, for example, employed 867 pat-
ent examiners at the end of 1981 and planned to hire 235 more by the end of 1982.
UNITED STATES DEP'T COMMERCE/PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, COMMISSIONER
OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR '81, at 15 (1982).
24. The Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 37,
asrevised, at Brussels, Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, T.S. No.
579, at The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1978, T.S. No. 834, 74 L.N.T.S. 289, at London,
June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S. No. 941, 192 L.N.T.S. 17, at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, [1962]
1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, and at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, [1970] 2 U.S.T. 1583,
T.I.A.S. No. 6923 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention] reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Conv. of Paris 3 (1982) (all cites are to the latest revision of the
agreement).
25. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
27. McKie, Patent Cooperation Treaty: A New Adventure in the Internationality of
Patents, 4 N.C. J. OF INT'L L. & COM. REG. 249, 250 (1979). Although this one year
period allows a patentee more time to file different national patent applications, many
tasks must be performed during this one year. The application must be translated into
the language of each target nation; the application must be revised to comply with each
nation's unique formality requirements; a patent agent must be appointed in each nation;
and national fees must be paid. These procedures may be both expensive and cumber-
some. Id
28. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733
[hereinafter cited as Patent Cooperation Treaty or PCT], reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr,
supra note 20, at Pat. Coop. Treaty 2.3 (1982).
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extends the priority period to twenty months, 29 but is binding on
only thirty-three nations.30 The PCT also reduces an inventor's
paperwork by requiring him to file only one application with a cen-
tral office. 3' This latter procedure represents a vast improvement
over the thirty-three individual national filings previously required
for identical protection. 32
Duplication of examination effort, however, is not eliminated by
the Paris Convention or the PCT. After the central office performs a
prior art search and a non-binding preliminary examination, the
application goes to each individual national office for an independ-
ent review. 33 The individual nations still apply their own law to
issues of patentability. 34 Thus, duplicity in examining effort by pat-
ent offices and in prosecuting effort by the applicant remains. Fur-
ther, a patent obtained in a given nation through the PCT is no
different than a patent obtained directly through that nation's patent
office; it is valid only in the territory of the grantor nation.35 The
inventor is still forced to weave a marketing strategy through an
international web of patent laws.
A few regional treaties establish consistent procedural and sub-
stantive provisions in the pre-grant patent laws of small groups of
nations.36 Because some of these agreements provide for a central
29. McKie, supra note 27, at 254.- This provision allows an inventor more time to
fulfill the expensive and time-consuming steps necessary for multi-national patent pro-
tection. Id
30. The nations adopting the PCT are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Came-
roon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Gabon, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Senegal, the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 2J J. SINNorr, supra note 20, at
Pat. Coop. Treaty 2-3.
3 1. McKie, supra note 27, at 252.
32. Id at 251-52. The applicant designates his target nations at the time of the initial
application filing, but can withdraw any or all designations within 20 months of filing
simply by abandoning his efforts to comply with formal national requirements. Id at
254.
33. Id at 253-54. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
34. See McKie, supra note 27, at 259 (Chances of obtaining patent protection in dif-
ferent nations through a PCT application vary because nations use different criteria in
searches conducted by their own national offices). See also Roth, The Luxembourg Con-
vention on the Community Patent: Complementary Application of National Law?, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 95, 102 (1977) (The PCT "is not primarily concerned with the estab-
lishment of an international patent, but with establishing procedures for sharing the work
in the international processing of patents.").
35. Cf PCT, supra note 28, at art. 11(3), reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at
Pat. Coop. Treaty 8 (all international PCT patent applications will be treated as regular
national applications in each designated State).
36. These cooperative attempts include the Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 7090) [hereinafter cited as Euro-
pean Patent Convention or EPC], reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC 2.1
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office which grants binding patents,37 both the cost to an inventor38
and the duplication of effort among national patent offices are signif-
icantly reduced. Except for one proposed convention,39 however, no
treaty provides for the unification of post-grant patent law. Much
closer cooperation therefore is still needed in the international patent
field to satisfy both the needs of inventors and of society.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE PARIS CONVENTION
The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention),40 is the forerunner of all international
patent cooperation agreements. Originally signed in 1883,'4 1 this
Convention is currently in force among eighty-eight nations, includ-
ing all industrialized nations and most developing nations.42 The
Convention represents the first step, albeit limited, toward interna-
tional patent cooperation. Because the Convention originated when
states clung tightly to notions of national sovereignty, even this lim-
ited cooperative effort is remarkable.43
The Paris Convention establishes four main principles of inter-
national patent law: national treatment; a twelve month priority
period; deferral of penalties for nonworking; and approval of subse-
(1982); The Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African and Malagasy Industrial
Property Office and its Annexes, Sept. 13, 1962 [hereinafter cited as Afro-Malagasy
Accord], reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Malagasy 2; and the Scandanavian
Patent Community.
37. See EPC, supra note 36, at art. 4, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20. at
EPC 5-6; Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 1, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT.
supra note 20, at Malagasy 3-4.
38. See Meller, supra note 15, at 18-22 (comparing the cost of prosecuting national
applications in the ten EPC member nations to the cost of filing through EPC
procedures).
39. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975[hereinafter cited as Community Patent Convention or CPC], reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Common Market 2.
40. Paris Convention, supra note 24.
41. Von Holstein, International Cooperation in the Field of Patent Law with Special
Reference to the Activities of the Council of Europe, 16 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 191, 192
(1967).
42. For a listing of Paris Convention members, see 19 INDUS. PROP. 8 (1980).
Because different nations adhere to different revisions of the Paris Convention, this sys-
tem of patent protection is particularly complicated and its smooth operation is impeded.
Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 194.
43. Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 193-94. But see generally Gansser, Violations of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 138
(1981) (The Paris Convention is of limited value in terms of any international coopera-
tive effort because member nations commit numerous unredressable violations).
236 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:229
quent agreements for further cooperation among member nations. 4
Under the principle of national treatment, no member nation may
treat a foreign patent applicant differently than it would treat its own
citizen with respect to its national pre- or post-grant patent law.45
Thus, a foreign inventor who attempts to obtain or enforce a patent
in a Paris Convention nation should not be handicapped solely
because of his nationality. No member nation may use its patent
system as a protectionist trade barrier.4 6
The second important provision of the Paris Convention estab-
lishes a twelve month priority period.47 Most nations require an
invention to be both novel and unobvious as of the date the patent
application is filed.48 Any pre-filing reference disclosing the inven-
tion or rendering it obvious negates patentability.49 References pub-
lished after the filing date but before patent grant have no preclusory
effect.50 The Paris Convention permits inventors to file a patent
application in any member nation and to claim the filing date of an
application filed for that invention in any other member nation up to
a year earlier.5' Thus, by filing for a patent in one nation, an inven-
tor can, in effect, freeze the state of the art. Subsequent technologi-
cal developments will not bar patentability in the other eighty-seven
member nations. The priority period gives the inventor one year
from the date of his initial filing to decide whether he wishes to incur
the cost of filing in the other member nations.5 2
44. See Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 193-95; Note, supra note 22, at 1004-05.
45. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 2, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note
20, at Conv. of Paris 5-6.
46. United States patent law arguably violates the principle of national treatment by
excluding evidence of prior inventorship in a foreign country. This has the effect of
favoring U.S. inventors over competing foreign inventors in interference proceedings.
See Gansser, supra note 43, at 166-69. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
47. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 4, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note
20, at Cony. of Paris 6-9.
48. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (1976); The Patent Law and The Enforcement
Law Thereof, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29 (Japan), reprinted in 2E J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20 at Japan 12.
49. See, e.g., The Patent Law and the Enforcement Law Thereof. supra note 48, at
art. 29, reprinted in 2E J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Japan 12.
50. See supra note 11 for a discussion of novelty and prior art.
51. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 4, reprinted in 2H J. SiNNOTT, supra note
20, at Conv. of Paris 6-9.
52. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 18.07.
The priority period is distinct from the public use grace period. The priority period
protects inventors from technological progress by others; the public use grace period pro-
tects inventors who use their own inventions publicly. The Paris Convention does not
standardize the public use grace period. Thus, while an inventor may develop his inven-
tion privately for up to one year before filing a patent application, he cannot show it
publicly or test market it without sacrificing patentability in nations that do not provide a
public use grace period. See supra note 11.
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The third major Convention principle requires member nations
to delay, for a specified number of years, the imposition of penalties
for failure to work a patent.53 Many nations require a patentee to
exploit or work his patent within the country.54 The patentee may
therefore be required to begin manufacturing or marketing his prod-
uct in that nation before doing so in other, and perhaps more profita-
ble, nations. Non-compliance may result in compulsory licensing or
revocation.55 The Convention's .delay principle removes such
restrictions on business flexibility.
Finally, the Convention permits member nations to enter into
"special agreements" among themselves for stronger cooperation.16
Most existing international patent cooperation agreements fall
within this "special agreement" clause.
B. INTER-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS
In 1910, the United States and nineteen Latin American states
signed the first "special agreement," the Buenos Aires Convention.
5 7
The agreement's provisions concerning national treatment and prior-
ity periods are very similar to those provided by the Paris Conven-
tion.58 The Convention includes some states that are not members of
the Paris Convention.5 9 Two earlier agreements between different
groups of Latin American nations were signed in 188960 and in
1902.61 The 1889 agreement remains in force between Peru and
Argentina.62 The Buenos Aires Convention is still in force between
53. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5A(4), reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Cony. of Paris 29.
54. See, e.g., Ministry of Economic Development, Decree No. 1190, art. 34 (1978)
(Colombia), reprinted in 2C J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Colombia 11-12.
55. See, e.g., id
56. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 19, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note
20, at Conv. of Paris 65.
57. Convention for the Protection of Inventions, Patents, Designs, and Industrial
Models, Aug. 20, 1910, 38 Stat. 1811, T.S. No. 595, 155 L.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter cited as
Buenos Aires Convention], reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Pan-American
3.
58. Compare, e.g., Buenos Aires Convention, supra note 57, at art. II, reprinted in 2H
J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Pan-American 5 with Paris Convention, supra note 24,
reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at Cony. of Paris 5-6.
59. Nations subscribing to the Buenos Aires Convention that do not subscribe to the
Paris Convention include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Compare Buenos
Aires Convention, supra note 57, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Pan-
American 3 (list of signatories to Buenos Aires Convention) with 19 INDUS. PROP. 6-8
(1980) (list of nations that are members of the Paris Convention).
60. Treaty on Patents of Invention, Jan. 16, 1889, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTr, supra
note 20, at Montevideo 3.
61. Treaty on Patents of Invention, Industrial Drawings and Models and Trade-
Marks, 1902, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Mexico City 3.
62. Note, supra note 22, at 1005.
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the United States and fourteen Latin American nations. 63
C. AFRICA
In 1958, twelve former French Overseas Territories gained their
independence.64 The patent laws that France had previously
enacted for them remained in force, but only as separate laws within
each territory.6 5 Because none of these new nations had the facilities
for an individual patent office, they banded together to establish one
central Industrial Property Office.6 6 The resulting agreement, the
Afro-Malagasy Accord, codifies the standards by which the Office is
to evaluate applications. The codified areas of pre-grant patent law
include provisions regarding patentable subject matter 67 and appli-
cation formalities.68 The Office does not examine applications for
novelty;69 thus, an adversary can later collaterally challenge a patent
on that ground. 70
A patent granted under the Afro-Malagasy Accord is not uni-
tary in character; it is separately valid in each member nation.7'
Thus, one nation may declare a patent unenforceable within its terri-
tory without affecting the patent's status in the other member
nations. To achieve some degree of consistency, the Accord requires
member nations to adopt the complete set of patent laws prescribed
in the agreement.72 In terms of breadth of subject matter coverage
this Accord currently represents the most comprehensive attempt at
international patent cooperation.
D. SCANDINAVIA
In 1964, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed an
63. Id at 1006.
64. See Finniss, The Protection of Industrial Property in the States Members of the
African and Malagasy Organization/or Economic Cooperation, 2 INDUS. PROP. 30, 30
(1963).
65. Id
66. Id
67. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at Annex I, arts. 2, 3. reprinted in 21 J.
SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Malagasy 185-86.
68. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at arts. 6-9, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Malagasy 187-89.
69. See Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 11, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Malagasy 189-90.
70. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 25(1), reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Malagasy 197.
71. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 1, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Malagasy 3-4.
72. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 2, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Malagasy 4.
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agreement to establish a Scandinavian Patent Community (SPC).7 3
Like the Afro-Malagasy Accord, the SPC would require each mem-
ber nation to adopt a single uniform substantive patent law.74
Unlike the Afro-Malagasy Accord, however, the SPC would not pro-
vide for a central Nordic Patent Office. Rather, any member nation
would have the power to grant a Nordic patent, which would be sep-
arately valid under each member nation's uniform law.75 Further,
both Nordic and national patents would be available. 76 An appli-
cant could apply for either separate national patents, or a single Nor-
dic patent.
As instruments of international cooperation, the SPC and Afro-
Malagasy Accord are comparable in scope. Each attempts to coordi-
nate pre- and post-grant patent law. Because the SPC concerns
industrially significant nations, however, its enforcement would
greatly benefit the industrialized world and therefore would be of
greater world-wide importance. 77 Although it is now believed that
the SPC will never become effective in its present form,78 it did result
in the modernization of the member nations' patent laws.79
E. EUROPE
In the early 1950's, the Council of Europe's Committee of
Experts on Patents decided that any efforts to unify the highly com-
plex patent laws of the European nations would have to be per-
formed gradually.80 Subsequent history reveals that unification has
indeed been gradual.
1. The Strasbourg Conventions
The Council of Europe sponsored three conventions that pro-
gressively improved patent cooperation. The First Strasbourg Con-
73. See generally, Godenhielm, The Scandinavian Patent Community, 4 INDUS. PROP.
10 (1965) (discussion of, and national responses to, the provisions of the SPC).
74. Id at 11.
75. Id at 13.
76. This practice substantially differs from provisions of the Afro-Malagasy Accord.
The Accord provides that patent applications submitted to the Central Office are the
equivalent of national applications in each member nation. Afro-Malagasy Accord,
supra note 36, at art. 4, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Malagasy 5.
77. Note, supra note 22, at 1011.
78. See Lewin, Introductory Remarks Concerning the Swedish Patents Act Following
the 1978 Revision, 18 INDUS. PROP. 22, 22-26 (1979).
Two commentators speculate that the idea of a Nordic patent may be revived as a
unitary patent under Article 142 of the European Patent Convention. Haertel & Singer,
Two Years of the European Patent Office and European Patent Law, 12 INT'L REV. OF
INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 277, 280 (1981). The Nordic patent would then be on a
par with the Community patent.
79. Lewin, supra note 78, at 22, 26; Note, supra note 22, at 1011.
80. Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 199.
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vention8' was signed in 1953 and prescribes uniform patent
application formalities.8 2 No member state may impose application
requirements stricter than those prescribed in the Convention. 83
Membership in this Convention has dwindled dramatically from its
peak of twenty nations in 1973 to its current membership of five. 84
The Second Strasbourg Convention8 5 was signed in 1954 and estab-
lishes an international patent classification system. Every examining
patent office maintains a file in which its examiners search for prior
art that may invalidate a new patent application. 86 In most of these
offices, the fie contains patents from many different nations.87 The
uniform classification system greatly simplifies the world-wide
search for existing patents.88 Twenty-seven nations, including the
United States, currently subscribe to the Second Strasbourg
81. European Convention Relating to the Formalities Required for Patent Applica-
tions, Dec. 11, 1953, 218 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter cited as First Strasbourg Convention].
82. Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 200. This convention was in force between a
majority of Council of Europe members. See id
83. First Strasbourg Convention, supra note 81, at art. 1.
84. Compare Conventions Not Administered by WIPO, 13 INDUS. PROP. 27, 28 (1974)
(member nations as of 1973 included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom)
with Conventions Not Administered by WIPO, 19 INDUS. PROP. 21 (1980) (member
nations as of 1980 included Iceland, Israel, South Africa, Spain and Turkey). This
decline probably resulted from a switch by member nations to the newly established
European Patent Convention (EPC) and its simpler filing procedures. The EPC sets out
the formalities of applications for a European Patent and also permits applicants to con-
vert to separate national applications without fulfilling new formalities. See EPC, supra
note 36, at arts. 78, 135-37, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at EPC 30, 52-53.
85. European Convention on the International Classification of Patents for Inven-
tion, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 51. The administration of this convention has been
transferred to the World Intellectual Property Organization. Convention Establishing
the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No.
6932, art. 4(ii).
86. If prior art renders an invention obvious or negates a determination of novelty,
an invention is not patentable. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. For a
definition of "prior art," see supra note 11.
87. See, e.g., Dann, The Activities ofthe United States Patent Office Concerning Public
Searches, Reading Centers, Microfilm Systems, Etc., THE ROLE OF PATENT INFORMATION
IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 53, 53 (1975) ("In the United States, as elsewhere, the
volume of patent literature in existence is continuing to expand dramatically .... [The
U.S. Patent Office] now ha[s] some eleven million copies of U.S. patents in [its] files, and
almost nine million foreign patents and other technical documents.").
88. Cf. Von Holstein, supra.note 41, at 204 (While it is essential to develop expedient
methods of conducting worldwide patent searches, the more important task assumed by
this convention is the internationalization of the patent document, resulting in similar
evaluations of patent applications, based on the same source of information). A uniform
classification system would also provide a basis for a central international retrieval sys-
tem. Cf. Pfanner, The Technical Program of WIPO in the Patent Documentation and
Information Retrieval Field, THE ROLE OF PATENT INFORMATION IN RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT 27, 28-29 (1975) (The Committee for International Cooperation in Infor-
mation Retrieval Among Examining Patent Offices (ICIREPAT), incorporated within
the framework of the Paris Union, is designed "to promote international cooperation in
the field of storage and retrieval of technical information, particularly in connection with
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Convention.89
The Third Strasbourg Convention 9° resulted from more than
eight years of comparative legal studies.91 Signed in 1963, this Con-
vention coordinates the law on certain fundamental issues regarding
patentability. The main value of the Convention is not in its admit-
tedly important progress toward unifying national patent laws, but
rather, in its delineation of categories in which issues of substantive
law can be discussed. The Convention lists three requirements for
patentability,92 defining each in general terms.93 Drafters of subse-
quent European agreements have been careful to use language com-
patible with these definitions. 94 The Third Strasbourg Convention's
final entry into force in 1980 resulted mainly from the growing
acceptance of the subsequent European agreements. 95
2. European and Community Patent Conventions
The European Economic Community (EEC)96 took the next
step in European patent cooperation. Several court decisions had
held that the principle of patent territoriality violated the Treaty of
Rome.97 In response to these holdings, the EEC decided to promul-
gate a plan for a Community patent.98 In 1962, the EEC Commis-
the searching or examination of applications for patents, inventors' certificates, or other
similar titles of protection.").
89. See 19 INDUS. PROP. 16 (1980). Subscribing nations include Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, German Demo-
cratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Spain, Suriname,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
90. Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents
for Invention of November 27, 1963, 47 Europ. T.S. [hereinafter cited as Third Stras-
bourg Convention], reprinted in 2. J. SINNOT, supra note 20, at Strasbourg Cony. 1.
91. Beier, The European Patent System, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1981).
92. For an invention to be patentable, it must be new (novel), involve an inventive
step (non-obvious), and be capable of industrial application (useful). Third Strasbourg
Convention, supra note 90, at art. I, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Stras-
bourg Cony. 2-3.
93. An invention is "susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in
any kind of industry including agriculture." Third Strasbourg Convention, supra note
90, at art. 3, reprinted in 23 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Strasbourg Cony. 2. "An inven-
tion shall be considered to be new if it does not form a part of the state of the art." Third
Strasbourg Convention, supra note 90, at art. 4(1), reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr, supra note
20, at Strasbourg Cony. 2. An invention involves "an innovative step if it is not obvious
having regard to the state of the art." Third Strasbourg Convention, supra note 90, at art.
5, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Strasbourg Cony. 3.
94. Von Holstein, supra note 41, at 202. Often, the EPC incorporates the exact words
used in the Third Strasbourg Convention to avoid any disagreement in language. Id
95. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 299-300.
96. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter referred to as Treaty of Rome].
97. Vanaskie, The European Patent Conventions: State Sovereignty Surrendered to
Establish a Supranational Patent, 1 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 73, 81-83 (1977).
98. Id at 83.
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sion published a Draft Convention to create a supranational patent
for the six EEC nations.9 9 Work on this ambitious plan stopped
when France objected to the United Kingdom's participation in the
negotiations.10 0 At that time, the United Kingdom was not an EEC
member.101
In 1969, the EEC resumed work on its Community patent
plan.10 2 To circumvent earlier problems, a two-part scheme was
introduced. 0 3 Part oite proposed only a common granting proce-
dure. Through a central European office, an inventor could obtain a
series of national patents covering the nations he specified. 1' 4 Any
member of the Paris Convention could join in this part of the
scheme.10 5 Part two of the scheme prescribed a single, supranational
patent, as contemplated under the 1962 Draft Convention, but cov-
ering only the territory of the six EEC nations. 0 6 An inventor from
any nation, including the United Kingdom, could obtain a suprana-
tional patent under part two. 0 7
Work done on the above proposal resulted in the European Pat-
ent Convention (EPC) 0 8 of 1973 and the Community Patent Con-
vention (CPC) 0 9 of 1975. The EPC establishes a central European
Patent Office which is responsible for searching and examining
European patent applications." 10 The Convention prescribes a com-
plete substantive and procedural law on issues relating to patent
grant. The Office grants a single patent, referred to as a European
patent, consisting of a bundle of national patents that are separately
valid in their respective nations.' The applicant designates the
nations to be covered. These individual national patents carry the
99. Provisions in this draft included a universal novelty requirement, a 20-year term,
renewal fees commencing two years after the original application, a deferred-examina-
tion system, and a provision allowing the application to be filed in French, German or
English. Further, a European Patent Court and European Patent Office would be estab-
lished, co-existing with national patent systems. Note, supra note 22, at 1008-11.
100. Vanaskie, supra note 97, at 83.
101. See infra note 107.
102. Thompson, The Draft Convention for a European Patent, 22 INT'L & COMp. L.Q.
51, 56 (1973).
103. Id at 54-55.
104. Id at 54.
105. Id at 55.
106. Id
107. The United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973 rendering the issue moot. Vanas-
kie, supra note 97, at 80 n.34. The United Kingdom now participates in both parts of the
scheme. See 19 INDUS. PROP. 20 (1980) (listing the United Kingdom as participating in
both the EPC and the CPC).
108. EPC, supra note 36.
109. CPC, supra note 39.
110. EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 10-25, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
EPC 7-13.
111. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 64, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at EPC
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same rights and duties as those domestically issued.1 12 Domestic law
applies to all post-grant issues, except patent validity.' 13 The Con-
vention lists the only grounds upon which a court may invalidate a
European patent."14 Because each national patent is separately
valid, however, invalidation in one nation does not mandate invali-
dation in any other nation." 5
Under the EPC, any group of member countries may enter into
a separate "special agreement" for a single supranational patent
valid among themselves." 6 This patent may be granted or revoked
only by the members as a unit." 7 Thus, an inventor granted a Euro-
pean patent in any nation in the group would automatically receive
rights and incur duties in the other nations participating in the agree-
ment.1 8 The Community Patent Convention, which is not yet in
force, satisfies the definition of a "special agreement.""19
The CPC is open only to EEC nations.' 20 If it enters into force,
an inventor, who obtains a European patent and designates an EEC
member as a target, will automatically obtain a Community patent
covering all EEC nations.' 2' The Community patent will be
enforced for the entire EEC through the courts of one member
nation, 22 and those courts will have to follow the post-grant patent
112. Id
113. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 74, reprinted in 21 J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at EPC
28.
114. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 138, reprinted in 21 J. SINiOTr, supra note 20, at EPC
53.
115. EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 67-68, reprinted in 21 J. SiNNorr, supra note 20, at
EPC 26-27.
116. See EPC, supra note 36, at art. 142, reprinted in 21 J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at
EPC 55.
117. See id (requiring that such a patent be unitary in character).
118. See id
119. Cf. CPC, supra note 39, at preamble, reprinted in 2. J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 2-3 ("To establish a Community Patent System designed to achieve the
objectives of the Treaty of Rome, it is necessary to conclude a convention constituting a
special agreement within the meaning of art. 142 of the EPC").
120. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 97, reprinted in 2J J. SINlorr, supra note 20, at Com-
mon Market 74-76. Any new member of the EEC must also adhere to the CPC. CPC,
supra note 39, at art. 95, reprinted in 21 J. SiNNo7r, supra note 20, at Common Market
73-74.
121. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 2, 3, reprinted in 2J J. SiNNOTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 5-6.
122. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 2(2), reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 33. The CPC specifies the nation whose courts will have exclusive
jurisdiction in a given case. A precedential listing of nations is given if the most pre-
ferred nation cannot afford jurisdiction. See CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 39, 68-70,
reprinted in 21 J. SiNNoTr, supra note 20, at Common Market 31-32, 53-56. The national
court must defer, however, to the European Patent Office if the validity of the patent is
called into question during the proceeding. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 56-57, 76-77,
reprinted in 21 J. SiNNoTr, supra note 20, at Common Market 44-46, 59-60.
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law incorporated in the Convention. 23
The post-grant substantive law codified in the CPC is not as
comprehensive as the Afro-Malagasy Accord or the Scandinavian
Patent Community codifications. Under the CPC, national law
applies to questions of infringement' 24 and compulsory license
requirements. 25 The Convention also includes a transitional provi-
sion, available for ten years, allowing a member nation to invalidate
a Community patent within its own borders. 2 6 The national invali-
dation, however, must follow rules prescribed in the Convention and
cannot affect the patent's status in other member nations.12 7
The EPC is currently in full force among eleven European
nations. 28 The CPC has been signed by all nine EEC nations, but
only six of these nations have ratified it.129 Ratification by all nine
member nations is necessary before the CPC can enter into force.' 30
F. PATENT COOPERATION TREATY
While European cooperation developed, the World Industrial
Property Organization (WIPO) and its predecessor, the United Inter-
national Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI),
also studied an agreement for greater international cooperation.' 3'
This effort resulted in the adoption of the Patent Cooperation Treaty(PCT) 32 in 1970.133 Although the PCT covers a broader geographic
scope than previous "special agreements" under the Paris Conven-
123. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 27-48, reprinted in 2J J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 21-38.
124. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 36(l), reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 29.
125. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 46-48, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 36-38.
126. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 90, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at Com-
mon Market 70-72. Upon request, the Council of the European Communities may
extend the effect of a reservation an additional five years. Id
127. Id
128. Signatories to the EPC include Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. Although Austria has signed the agreement, it has adopted the
option available under art. 167(2)(a) and (d), precluding patent protection for chemical,
pharmaceutical, or food products. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 279.
129. Id at 306. Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands have not yet ratified the CPC.
Id
130. Id The CPC will enter into force three months after the last signatory ratifies the
convention and deposits the instrument of ratification. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 98,
reprinted in 21 J. SINtNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 76.
131. Thompson, supra note 102, at 55. As part of this effort, the six nations who
receive the largest number of patent applications annually were consulted: France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id
132. PCT, supra note 28.
133. Thompson, supra note 102, at 55.
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tion,134 it fails to unify any substantive patent law. Rather, it is
designed to simplify the procedure for obtaining multinational pat-
ent protection. Under the PCT, an inventor needs to file only one
application for all nations in which he desires protection. 35 A Cen-
tral Receiving Office receives the application and determines
whether it meets certain formal requirements. 36 The Office then
forwards the application, and all relevant prior art findings, to
national patent offices for substantive processing. 137 The PCT also
extends the inventor's priority period to twenty months. 38
The PCT, the EPC, and the CPC are all compatible. Together
they supply several alternative routes for inventors seeking multina-
tional patent protection. 39 Because none of these agreements
replace individual national patents, an inventor has the traditional
option of filing separate applications in each target country.14°
Alternatively, if an inventor desires protection only in Europe, he
may file a European patent application, designating specific target
nations. This alternative allows an inventor to secure patent protec-
tion in as many as eleven countries by prosecuting a single applica-
tion.' 4' If the CPC enters into force, a European patent application
designating one EEC member as a target nation will automatically
be treated as a Community patent application. 142 If a patent is
awarded, it will be valid in all nine EEC nations. The inventor may
still designate any of the remaining EPC countries as additional
134. Thirty-three nations on six continents subscribe to the PCT. See supra note 30.
135. McKie, supra note 27, at 251-52.
136. PCT, supra note 28, at arts. 10, 11.
137. Id at art. 20. Applicants from nations that have elected Chapter II coverage
under the PCT may also request a non-binding determination of patentability. These
confidential opinions are sent to the applicant who may then send them to national pat-
ent offices. McKie, supra note 27, at 258-59. The United States has elected not to be
bound under Chapter II. Id at 258.
138. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The priority period is extended to
twenty-five months if the applicant requests a preliminary patentability examination.
McKie, supra note 27, at 258.
139. Kalikow, An International Patent Department Looks at Multi-Country Patent
Arrangements and at its Future, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 723, 730 (1976).
140. Even if the CPC enters into force, national patents will still be available. CPC,
supra note 39, at art. 6, reprinted in 2J1J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 7.
Thus, if the CPC enters into force, four alternative routes to European patent protection
will be available: the direct national patent route; the PCT-national route; the EPC
route; and the PCT-EPC route. Kalikow, supra note 139, at 730. Determinative factors
in deciding which route to pursue include: (1) location of the patent search; (2) the
number of nations in which patent protection is sought; (3) time required for making
foreign filing decisions; (4) language of the application and proceedings; (5) filing, trans-
lation and maintenance costs of securing patent protection; (6) likelihood of obtaining
the patent; and (7) uniformity and scope of protection desired. Id
141. See supra notes 110-15 & 128 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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targets. 143
As a third alternative, the PCT allows an inventor to seek patent
protection in as many as thirty-three designated target nations by
filing an international patent application. Although an inventor
must prosecute his application separately in each nation, the PCT
route reduces necessary paperwork and offers an extended priority
period. 144 Like the EPC applicant, a PCT applicant designating an
EEC member as a target nation automatically applies for a Commu-
nity patent.' 45
Under a fourth alternative, an inventor may file a PCT applica-
tion and designate the European Patent Office as one of his
targets.146 By pursuing this alternative, an inventor gains the advan-
tages of both the PCT and the EPC: paperwork is minimized
because a single application suffices for all designated nations; 47 the
extended PCT priority period applies; 48 and prosecution procedure
is simplified.' 49 Although an inventor must prosecute his application
separately in each non-European national office, a single prosecution
for all designated European nations suffices. 150 When the CPC
enters into force, designation of an EEC nation will automatically
result in a Community patent application.' 51
An inventor may follow any or all of the above routes to mul-
tinational patent protection. In the final analysis, economics will
likely dictate which route an inventor selects.' 52
143. Cf. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 3, reprintedin 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC
5 (each applicant designates his target nations) and EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 142,
149(l), reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC 55, 56 (permitting special agree-
ments, such as the CPC, to require joint designation only of those nations party to the
special agreement).
144. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
145. PCT, supra note 28, at art. 45, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Pat.
Coop. Treaty 30 (provision allowing regional patent treaties); CPC, supra note 39, at
preamble, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 2-3 (CPC is a
regional patent treaty under the PCT).
146. See PCT, supra note 28, at arts. 2(xii)-(xiii), 4(1)(ii), reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Pat. Coop. Treaty 3-5 (PCT applicants may designate regional patent
offices as targets); EPC, supra note 36, at art. 153, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note
20, at EPC 58 (European Patent Office may be designated as a regional patent office
within the meaning of PCT art. 2(xiii)).
147. Cf. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 150, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at
EPC 57 (A PCT application designating the European Patent Office as a target automati-
cally suffices as an EPC application).
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
150. Id
151. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 2, 3, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20 at
Common Market 5-6.
152. See supra note 140.
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III
TOWARD UNIFICATION
A. A BASIC QUESTION: UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION?
Present international patent cooperation is limited: most
nations have their own procedural and substantive patent law;' 53 all
industrially significant, as well as many developing nations, adhere
to the Paris Convention and must accord national treatment to for-
eign applicants and patentees; 154 thirty-three members of the Paris
Convention, having adopted the Patent Cooperation Treaty, give
patent applicants the option of using a common international filing
procedure; 55 and several regional arrangements create patents that
are valid in member nations.1 56
Some of the regional arrangements unify the pre-grant substan-
tive patent law. Under the EPC, a central office, following rules pre-
scribed in the treaty, grants a single patent that is valid in all
member nations designated by the applicant. 57 The unified pre-
grant patent law exists independently of the various national laws; it
is codified in the treaty, not in the national codes, and it is adminis-
tered by a central body. 58 The patent is not subject to different
national laws until after it issues.159 The Afro-Malagasy Accord also
unifies pre-grant patent law and establishes a central administrating
office.' 60 Like the European patent, once an Afro-Malagasy patent
is issued, it becomes subject to the post-grant substantive law of each
member nation.' 6 ' Unlike EPC members, however, all Afro-Mala-
gasy nations have identical post-grant patent law codes.162 Thus, the
Afro-Malagasy Accord harmonizes the post-grant patent law of its
members. The post-grant patent law is not unified, though, because
no central body administers it and different national interpretations
will partly counteract the uniformity envisioned by the treaty.
153. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 57-72, 108-30 and accompanying text.
157. EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 1, 2, 3, 4(3), reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20,
at EPC 5-6.
158. EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 1, 4, 52-105, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20,
at EPC 5-6, 22-40.
159. EPC, supranote 36, at art. 64, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC
25.
160. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 1, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Malagasy 3.
161. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 5, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Malagasy 5.
162. Afro-Malagasy Accord, supra note 36, at art. 2, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Malagasy 4.
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The Scandinavian Patent Convention would harmonize both
the pre-grant and post-grant patent laws of its members. Although
any member nation could grant a Scandinavian patent, it would
have to be done pursuant to the pre-grant patent law set out in the
Convention and adopted by each member nation. Also, once a pat-
ent was granted, it would become subject to the same post-grant pat-
ent law that each member of the Convention is required to adopt. 63
The Community Patent Convention would unify both pre- and
post-grant patent laws. 64 Because only the European Patent Office
can grant a Community patent, pre-grant law is necessarily unified.
Similarly, because the CPC establishes a system of law independent
of its members' national systems, post-grant law is also unified. 65
The choice between harmonization and unification is important
in any international system. Harmonization permits member states
to retain most of their sovereign power, whereas unification demon-
strates states' commitment to a true international patent. If practical
to implement, unification is the more desirable alternative. 66 In the
pre-grant area, a single international patent office would provide a
uniform quality for both search and examination, as well as a uni-
form interpretation of the substantive law of patent grant. This con-
sistency would permit courts to reach a more uniform view regarding
the weight to accord a presumption of patent validity. 67 Thus, a
unified pre-grant law would enhance a patentee's ability to estimate
the strength of his patent. Mere harmonization of these areas would
require courts to accord varying weights to presumptions of patent
validity, depending on the quality of the search and examination
conducted by the particular issuing office. A uniform interpretation
of pre-grant substantive law would also discourage forum shopping
by inventors.
Similarly, unification is more desirable than harmonization in
the area of post-grant substantive patent law. Uniformity in this
area assumes greater importance because the costs involved are
much higher. Patent infringement litigation, for example, typically
occurs only after one or both parties have invested substantial
163. Godenhielm, supra note 73, at 10-11.
164. CPC, supra note 39. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
165. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 1, reprinted in 2.1 J. SINNOrr, supra note 20, at Com-
mon Market 5.
166. Unification may be easier to achieve than harmonization. The experience of the
EEC illustrates the long, arduous, and precise task that harmonization of various
national patent laws involves. Further, nations are very sensitive to any change in their
patent laws. It is easier for governments to establish common rules establishing new
institutions that do not unduly interfere with their established national systems. Thomp-
son, supra note 102, at 57.
167. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
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amounts of money in introducing a product into the market.168 Even
if a code defining infringement is harmonized, different national
interpretations can produce results almost as inconsistent as entirely
different codes. Further, unification allows for the complete resolu-
tion of all issues in a single proceeding, whereas harmonization
requires parties to relitigate identical issues in each relevant
jurisdiction. 169
B. AN OBSTACLE TO UNIFICATION: NATIONS'
RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE
Differences between various national laws render unification in
any substantive law area difficult.' 70 Patent law is no exception. 17'
At its first meeting, for example, the PCT Committee of Experts
rejected the idea of a true international patent because it feared that
the requisite coordination of the various national laws would take
years.' 72 In addition, once a uniform codification is achieved, it will
necessarily be inconsistent with various existing national patent laws.
For this reason, many nations may be reluctant to adopt any uni-
form codification. During the PCT negotiations, for example, the
United States delegation vehemently opposed a provision that would
require the United States to alter its substantive law regarding nov-
elty of invention. 7 3 Similarly, Congress rejected a later effort to
168. Corporate secrecy usually prevents a patent holder from discovering allegedly
infringing products until after they appear on the market.
169. One commentator believes that multi-jurisdictional litigation may be helpful to
the parties involved. Each time an issue relating to a patent is litigated, the parties learn
from the experience. They therefore become better able to litigate the same issue in
another jurisdiction. Meller, supra note 15, at 15. This analysis, however, ignores several
key factors. First, both parties learn from the original litigation experience. Thus, if one
party learns how to improve his case, so will his opposing party. Neither party could
expect a greater advantage in a subsequent proceeding. Second, because the various
national patent systems are not unified, any advantage one party might achieve would be
minimal. Each jurisdiction has its own procedural and substantive patent laws, and the
parties must adapt their arguments to these different laws. Finally, any advantage that
could be obtained through multi-jurisdictional litigation would be far outweighed by the
legal cost incurred in multiple suits.
170. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 91, at I. ("Every comparative lawyer is aware of the
great difficulties in departing from long-established, deeply-rooted national solutions and
will be pleased if small progress can be noted at the end of all harmonization
endeavors.").
171. See, e.g., Richenberg, International Cooperation in Patents-Past, Present, and
Future, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 734, 737-38 (1967); Comment, The EEC Patent Union and
Political Integration, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 342, 353 (1973).
172. McKie, supra note 27, at 259.
173. Clark,.4nother View ofthe Patent Cooperation Treat--The.4merican PositionAt
andAfter the Washington Diolomatic Conference, 2 INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT L. 260, 261-65 (1971).
An invention must be novel to be patentable in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1976). If the invention was described in any reference published by a third party before
the date of invention, the invention is not novel. Id § 102(a). Further, an invention is
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modify the United States substantive patent law. President Johnson
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 1967174 to "bring the U.S. pat-
ent System more closely into harmony with those of other
nations."' 175 The bill would have: (1) eliminated the applicant's one
year grace period between publicly disclosing his invention and
filing for a patent; (2) replaced the first-to-invent priority system with
a first-to-file system; and (3) replaced the domestic novelty standard
with an absolute international prior-art novelty standard.' 76 Both
the American Bar Association and the American Patent Law Associ-
ation opposed this bill. 177
As demonstrated by the Scandinavian Patent Convention, har-
monization efforts may fail if participating nations are not ready to
change their substantive laws.' 78 The SPC harmonized most of the
substantive patent law in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Den-
mark, 179 but because of resistance in the industrial sector,8 0 the lat-
ter two nations never fully adopted the code. In addition to
generally opposing the proposed Nordic patent system, Denmark
and Norway found the extension of patent protection to foods and
medicines especially objectionable. 18 Thus, the SPC never entered
not novel if a third party applied for a U.S. patent for the same invention before the
applying inventor's stated date of invention. Id § 102(e). During the PCT negotiations,
the United States delegation feared that a proposed article would add a third factor
negating a determination of novelty: the filing of a patent application with the PCT
office prior to the new inventor's stated date of invention. Such a provision is contrary to
U.S. law. In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
Although the PCT effected some changes in United States patent laws, such changes
merely concerned the content of patent applications. For example, U.S. law previously
limited the number of dependent claims for each independent claim to five. This limita-
tion has been eliminated by the PCT. Multiple dependent claims may now be filed.
McKie, supra note 27, at 253. This is a change in form only; it does not substantially
affect U.S. patent practice.
174. S. 1042, H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
175. Letter from President Johnson to Congress, Feb. 21, 1964, reprinted in U.S. Con-
gress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Patent Reform Act of1967,
Communication from the President of the United States, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at iii, iv
(1967).
176. Note, supra note 22, at 1015-16.
177. See Nicolai, First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent: A Comparative Study Based on Ger-
man and United States Patent Law, 3 INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 103,
104 n.6 (1972).
178. The Afro-Malagasy Accord's harmonization of the patent laws of member
nations is similar to the SPC's harmonization efforts. Existing conditions, however,
favored harmonization of the patent laws of the Afro-Malagasy nations. All members
were French overseas territories prior to gaining their independence in 1958. While
French territories, the nations operated under a common patent law. After 1958, this law
remained in effect in each member nation. Finniss, supra note 64, at 30-31. Thus, agree-
ment on the substantive patent law provisions incorporated in the 1962 Accord was not
difficult.
179. Lewin, supra note 78, at 22.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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into force, and the Convention's efforts toward harmonization of
Scandinavian laws were largely unrewarded. 8 2
When nations are not ready for complete unification, alternative
measures may be pursued. Accepting the theory that partial unifica-
tion is better than none at all,183 both the European Patent Conven-
tion and the Community Patent Convention stop short of complete
unification. Membership in these Conventions does not require
complete abandonment of a nation's substantive patent law and may
account for their acceptance among a growing number of nations. 8 4
These conventions use three techniques to tailor the effects of unifi-
cation to the particular needs of their members.
1. Bifurcation
Two separate conventions constitute the European Patent Sys-
tem. The European Patent Convention unifies the pre-grant law
regarding European patents, and lists the sole grounds for their revo-
cation. 185 The Community Patent Convention, which applies only to
patents granted under the EPC, 186 unifies a substantial amount of
post-grant patent law. While eleven nations are members of the
EPC, 187 only six EPC members also belong to the CPC.188 This
bifurcation, although evolving mainly from political considera-
tions, 89 demonstrates one technique a treaty can use to achieve dif-
ferent levels of substantive unification. Use of this technique is
cumbersome, however, and should be used only when negotiations
demonstrate a need for a major treaty division.
2. Reservations
Reservations are a more manageable technique for custom tai-
loring international agreements to meet diverse national needs. By
subscribing to a reservation, a signatory nation stipulates that a par-
ticular section of the convention shall not apply to it. Generally, if a
treaty provides reservations, any participating nation may subscribe
to them. Both the EPC and the CPC permit reservations for certain
182. It is generally believed the SPC will never enter into force. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
183. See Roth, supra note 34, at 106.
184. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 298. See supra notes 124-27 and accompany-
ing text.
185. Vanaskie, supra note 97, at 85. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
186. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 1(2), reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Common Market 5.
187. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 279. See supra note 128 for a listing of EPC
member nations.
188. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 306.
189. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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provisions that radically depart from the national law of some mem-
ber nations. 90 When a nation subscribes to a reservation, that
nation's domestic law fills the resulting gap in the treaty codification.
There is some concern that the availability of reservations in the
CPC may undermine the unification it otherwise achieves.' 9'
3. Deference to National Law
Finally, on some questions, an agreement can explicitly or
implicitly defer to the patent laws of its member nations. The Com-
munity Patent Convention uses this technique. 92 Deference to
national laws proves especially useful in areas that are of special
national concern and in which different laws will have little impact
on the effective operation of the international patent system. 193
C. INTERMEDIATE PATENT UNIFICATION: A PROPOSAL
Agreements for international patent cooperation attempt to
improve an inventor's economic incentive to obtain multinational
patent protection. The EPC demonstrates that pre-grant patent law
unification can substantially reduce the cost of obtaining multina-
tional patent protection. 194 Similarly, post-grant patent law unifica-
tion can significantly improve the value of an inventor's patents.
Because patent value assessments are simplified, an inventor's use of
his patents becomes more capable of accurate cost/benefit analysis.
Further, because patent litigation is concentrated in a single pro-
ceeding, an inventor's assertion or defense of his patent becomes less
190. Notable examples include the provision on compulsory licensing for nonworking,
CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 47, 82, 89, reprinted in 23 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at
Common Market 37, 63, 69-70, and the patentability of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
foods, EPC, supra note 36. at art. 167(2)(a), reprinted in 21 J. SINOTT, supra note 20, at
EPC 64-65.
191. Roth, supra note 34, at 122-26. Roth argues that the reservations available under
the CPC allowing a Community patent to be declared invalid within the territory of a
contracting state contradicts a fundamental goal and principle of the CPC-the creation
of a common system of law for CPC members with a Community Patent having unitary
effect in all member nations. This reservation may remain effective for fifteen years. Id
at 125. See CPC, supra note 39, at art. 90, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr. supra note 20, at
Common Market 70-72.
192. For example, under the CPC, national law determines the liability of infringers
whose use began prior to an actual patent grant. Some nations allow a third party com-
mercially using an invention pending the inventor's actual receipt of a patent to continue
using the invention after the patent is granted. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 38, reprinted in
2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 30-31.
193. In addition to relatively unimportant issues, the CPC defers to national law on
one vitally important issue: infringement. Similarly, national law controls on the issue
of compulsory licensing. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
194. Under the EPC, filing costs total about $3,000 for a European patent that is valid
in all member nations. The cost of filing applications for separate patents in each, of
these nations would be within the range of$10,000 to $20,000. Meller, supra note 15, at
9.
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costly. On the other hand, the more closely a treaty's substantive law
conforms to a nation's existing patent law, the more likely the nation
will ratify the treaty. 195 Thus, extensive treaty ratification will occur
only when the treaty flexibly accommodates the differences between
nations' existing patent laws.
The techniques used by the EPC and the CPC, bifurcation, res-
ervations, and national law deference, attempt to reconcile conflict-
ing national interests. A fourth device, legal alternatives, could
similarly be used to encourage greater international patent coopera-
tion. A treaty could provide two or three alternatives for the most
important substantive issues on which national laws significantly dif-
fer. Before signing the treaty, each nation could select and adopt the
alternative most closely resembling its own law. 196 Because such a
treaty would substantially reduce the number of different national
requirements for patent protection, a patentee could more easily
exploit his invention worldwide. Further, other benefits of unifica-
tion would also inure to the patentee. Because the number of legal
opinions regarding post-grant substantive issues would be drastically
reduced, a patentee could more easily assess the strength of his pat-
ent and plan the commercial exploitation of his invention accord-
ingly. Finally, the cost of worldwide patent litigation would be
substantially reduced. Fewer issues would require litigation, and
resolution of all litigated issues could take place in one forum.1
97
195. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text. This proposition remains valid
when an international patent law coexists with individual national patent systems.
Although an international agreement may not require any change in member nations'
laws regarding national patents, experience demonstrates that member nations will still
incorporate such changes. Eight of the eleven nations signing the EPC have harmonized
their national patent law with the EPC codification. Similarly, five of these eight nations
have harmonized their law with the CPC codification that is not yet in effect. Haertel &
Singer, supra note 78, at 298-99. This unrequired harmonization may result from the
impracticality of one nation maintaining two different, and sometimes inconsistent, pat-
ent law systems. For a discussion of this spontaneous harmonization, see generally Beier,
supra note 91, at 6-7.
196. This technique is analagous to the use of alternatives in the Uniform Commercial
Code. In the warranty section of the UCC, U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978), the drafters codified
three alternative forms of law so no state would be forced to adopt a provision that
substantially deviated from its traditional law. This system of options is especially
important in as controversial an area as expressed and implied warranties. See id, com-
ment 3.
197. For a given area of substantive patent law in which alternatives are available, the
parties to a dispute would litigate the issue as it is formulated under each relevant alter-
native. Suppose, for example, that the treaty permits each contracting nation to select
either of two alternative formulations for the scope of the monopoly that will inure to the
holder of an international patent within the nation's borders. See infra text following
note 237. Then if a patentee sues an alleged infringer, he need litigate the question of
infringement under no more than two formulations of the scope of his monopoly. This is
true regardless of the number of nations in which the defendant is alleged to have
infringed. Furthermore, the treaty could provide that both issues be decided in the same
forum. If the defendant is not alleged to have infringed in any nation which subscribes
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The use of legal alternatives is necessarily limited. First, it can
be used only a few times in a treaty, and can provide only a few
alternatives each time. If this limitation is ignored, the number of
permutations will grow to equal the number of treaty signatories.
The benefits inventors acquire as a result of unification must not be
negated by allowing each member nation to adopt a unique set of
alternatives fully embodying its already existing substantive law. 98
Second, legal alternatives can be applied only to certain issues. It is
unnecessary to apply this technique to minor issues, such as the
determination of an annual maintenance fee. National law can ade-
quately handle such issues without sacrificing any benefits of unifica-
tion. Similarly, alternatives cannot effectively deal with major treaty
divisions. Whether, for example, member nations wish to join in
treaty provisions establishing a unitary supranational patent, is an
inappropriate issue for a system of alternatives. Because this issue
implicates strong political considerations, those joining in such pro-
visions would probably want exclusive control over the addition of
new members.' 99 The bifurcation technique used to separate the
EPC and the CPC would more effectively handle such an issue.
While this Note does not attempt the ambitious task of propos-
ing an entire treaty for international patent cooperation, it does
examine sample areas of substantive patent law that such a treaty
should address. For each substantive area discussed, two determina-
tions will be made: (1) whether partial unification is possible and/or
necessary; and (2) which technique for partial unification is appro-
priate. Various national patent laws will be used to support the cho-
sen technique.
D. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSAL
A more complete examination of the possibilities for unification
of specific substantive areas of international patent law requires a
treaty framework. The framework adopted here serves merely as a
to the second formulation, the parties of course would not litigate the infringement ques-
tion under that formulation.
198. This Note uses the term "substantive law" broadly to include such areas as com-
pulsory licensing and the definition of novelty.
199. Creation of a unitary supranational patent requires some sacrifice by participat-
ing nations. If there is a common granting procedure, each nation is entrusting to an
external body the power to decide whether an applicant is to enjoy monopoly rights in
the nation's territory. If there is a unified system of post-grant substantive law, each
nation is entrusting to an external body the power to decide the rights and liabilities of
persons in the nation's territory. These external bodies do not necessarily owe allegiance
to any particular nation. If participating nations are wary of delegating such powers,
they may at least want veto power over who may exercise them.
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model for this Note; various other treaty arrangements could be
used.
The general treaty framework used herein makes several
assumptions. First, it assumes that the treaty unifies pre-grant patent
law. Thus, the treaty codifies all the procedural and substantive law
relating to the grant of an international patent, and creates a central
office with exclusive power to grant the patent. The existence of a
central office simplifies the application process and provides a uni-
form standard for search and examination of applications. Further,
the unified pre-grant law allows for the development of a uniform
interpretation of the codified law.2°°
Second, the framework assumes that the treaty codifies a uni-
form post-grant patent law. Unlike the pre-grant law, however,
there is no central administrative body. Rather, the treaty estab-
lishes that the interpretations of treaty provisions constitute a sepa-
rate body of law existing independently of any national legal
system.20 The courts of each member nation must follow the treaty
interpretations and the decisions of the highest court of every other
member nation. Thus, in time, a uniform body of substantive post-
grant patent law would develop.202
Third, the treaty requires each applicant to designate the
nations in which he desires protection. The applicant would gain
patent rights only in the nations listed on his application. 20 3 In addi-
tion, the patent is unitary; if invalidated by one member nation, it is
invalid everywhere. 2°4 Thus, resolution of disputes would occur in a
single proceeding. To prevent forum shopping, the treaty specifies
which member nation will have exclusive jurisdiction to determine a
patent's validity.i °5
200. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. As demonstrated by the history
of the EPC, unified pre-grant law can operate successfully. Further, the future success of
the EPC may be even more promising. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 305-08.
201. This approach closely parallels CPC provisions. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 1-2,
reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 5-6.
202. Ideally, the treaty would create a supranational patent court to hear final appeals
from the national courts. It remains questionable, however, whether signatory nations
would agree to relinquish so much of their sovereign power. The proposed provisions,
modeled after the CPC, permit member nations to retain most of their sovereignty while
still achieving some uniformity in the interpretation of post-grant substantive treaty
provisions.
203. Although the EPC uses this approach, EPC, supra note 36, at arts. 2-3, reprinted
in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC 5, the CPC does not. Under the CPC, an appli-
cant cannot obtain protection in one Community nation without also obtaining it in all
other Community nations. CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 2-3, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Common Market 5-6.
204. This provision is modeled after the CPC approach. CPC, supra note 39, at art.
2(2), reprinted in 21 J. SINOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 5-6.
205. The CPC adopts this approach. Provisions of the CPC delineate which nation
will have exclusive jurisdiction in a patent-dispute proceeding. Generally, the nation
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Finally, the new international patent system would coexist with
individual national patent systems and all presently existing interna-
tional systems. The new treaty would be a special agreement within
the meaning of the Paris Convention 206 and the EPC,20 7 and would
establish a regional patent within the meaning of the PCT.208 An
applicant could choose to file separate national patent applications,
as well as seek patent protection in different nations through the use
of existing conventions. 20 9 The new international system would pro-
vide a simple alternative; an applicant using the new system could
gain patent protection in all member nations through a single filing
procedure.
L Priority of Znventorship
In every nation, only one inventor (or group of inventors work-
ing together) may patent a specific invention. Thus, when two
inventors independently develop the same invention, the law must
determine which one will receive the patent. Different nations use
different criteria to resolve this issue. The United States,210
Canada, 21 and the Philippines 212 award the patent to the person
who first conceived of the invention, regardless of who first applied
for it ("first-to-invent" rule). This approach affords an inventor time
to perfect his invention and evaluate its commercial feasibility
before actually applying for a patent.213 All other Paris Convention
nations grant the patent to the first inventor to file a patent applica-
tion ("first-to-file" rule).214 This approach encourages the speedy
having jurisdiction will be the nation where the applicant resided or was doing business
at the time the patent application was filed. CPC, supra note 39, at art. 39(l)(2), reprinted
in 2J J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Common Market 31. When this provision is inappli-
cable, the CPC lists a precedential ordering of the nations that will have jurisdiction.
CPC, supra note 39, at arts. 39, 69-70, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at Com-
mon Market 31-32, 54-56.
206. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 19, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTr, supra note
20, at Cony. of Paris 65.
207. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 142, reprinted in 21 J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at EPC
55.
208. PCT, supra note 28, at arts. 2(iv), 45, reprinted in 23 J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Pat. Coop. Treaty 2.4, 30.
209. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text. Of course, an inventor would
have to comply with all convention requirements, as well as observe all relevant priority
periods, to secure the desired patent protection.
210. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 135 (1976).
211. Patent Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 203, § 45 (1970), reprinted in 2C J. S1NNOTT,
supra note 20, at Canada 31-34.
212. Patent Act (Republic Act No. 165, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 637 & 864),
1st Cong., 2d Sess., § 10, reprinted in 2G J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at Philippines 139.
213. Nicolai, supra note 177, at 115.
214. Id at 105.
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disclosure of inventions, 215 while avoiding the expensive interference
proceedings 216 necessary to prove prior inventorship. Both rules are
justifiable, and a conclusive evaluation of the relative merit of each
rule is impossible without empirical studies.217 Yet, each nation is
reluctant to abandon its preferred rule.21 8
An international patent treaty must resolve the first-to-file vs.
first-to-invent dichotomy. Because of the nearly universal support
for the first-to-file rule2 19 and the tenacity with which the United
States clings to the contrary first-to-invent rule, 220 this issue may
present the greatest impediment to the adoption of an international
patent system.
Fortunately, a technique achieving partial unification may per-
mit a compromise solution. The American desire to retain the first-
to-invent rule may derive primarily from a United States evidence
rule that effectively prevents a foreign applicant from proving a date
of inventorship prior to his first United States or foreign patent
application.221 In effect, the United States applies a first-to-file rule
to foreign patent applicants, while applying a first-to-invent rule to
domestic patent applicants. 222 Thus, a United States patent appli-
cant maintains a considerable advantage over a foreign applicant
seeking patent protection for an identical invention.
Because the proposed patent treaty does not affect existing
national systems, 223 the American inventor would retain his advan-
tage in a case where he and his rival are both seeking a traditional
United States patent. If both inventors are seeking an international
patent, however, the treaty should require the application of the first-
215. Id at 112. The first-to-file rule also reduces the burden on the Patent Office in
determining facts regarding inventorship. Id
216. The interference proceedings associated with U.S. patent law have been criticized
sharply. The proceedings delay the issuance of a patent, as well as prolong the legal
uncertainties regarding one's patent rights. Further, because such proceedings may be
expensive, independent inventors and small businesses with limited financial resources
are disadvantaged. Id at 120.
217. Id at 130.
218. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
221. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1976); Clark, supra note 173, at 262-63; Nicolai, supra note
177, at 132.
222. Nicolai, supra note 177, at 132. For a general discussion of whether these rules
violate the national treatment provisions of the Paris Convention, see Brody, U.S. Treaty
Law, The Paris Convention, & 35 USC 119, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 194 (1971).
223. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
As demonstrated by the EPC experience, even if a unified patent system is adopted
and operates successfully, it is unlikely domestic patents will disappear. Since the EPC
entered into force, the number of national patent applications filed by foreigners has
decreased. This decrease, however, has been smaller than the number of applications
filed for European patents. See Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 301.
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to-file rule favored by the majority of nations. In return for this con-
cession by the United States, the treaty should permit the United
States to apply its first-to-invent rule where one inventor holds a
traditional United States patent and the other holds an international
patent that covers the United States.
The proposed treaty could achieve the above compromise solu-
tion through the use of a reservation. The treaty could require appli-
cation of the first-to-file rule whenever an international patent is
involved. Member nations would be able, however, to make a reser-
vation whenever a domestic patent is involved. By making such a
reservation, the United States would be able to apply its evidentiary
exclusion rule against all foreign applicants seeking protection in the
United States under either an international or national patent, if the
competing domestic inventor holds a traditional United States pat-
ent. This reservation would eliminate a serious obstacle to interna-
tional patent agreement without sacrificing the benefits attributable
to international patent cooperation.
2. Patentable Subject Matter
Most nations issue patents for only certain types of inventions.
Austria, for example, will not grant patents for inventions "contrary
to law or morality or the subject matter of which is reserved to a
monopoly of the Federal Republic .... -224 The EPC proscribes
the patenting of plant and animal varieties and biological processes
for their production, as well as any inventions contrary to the public
order or morality.225 The EPC further restricts patentable subject
matter by incorporating a narrow definition of "invention." Unpat-
entable items include:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games,
or doing business, and programs for computers; and
(d) presentations of information.2 26
While some nations make all subject matter patentable and then spe-
cifically exclude certain types of inventions, other nations provide
patent protection only for certain enumerated classes of inven-
224. Austrian Patent Act 1977 § 2(1), reprinted in 2B J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at
Austria 3 (1982).
225. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 53, reprinted in 21 J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at EPC
22. The EPC, however, specifically recognizes the patentability of processes and their
products. Id
226. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 52(2), reprinted in 21 J. SINNOT, supra note 20, at
EPC 22.
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tions.227 The United States, for example, will issue patents only for
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.228
Broad judicial interpretations of these provisions, however, partialy
conform the United States law on subject mater patentability with
that of other nations.229
Although partial conformity among national patent laws exists,
important differences remain. Perhaps the most controversial area
of subject matter patentability concerns chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
and foods. These items are clearly patentable in the United States,
and as clearly unpatentable elsewhere.230 Many nations feel theoret-
ically justified in excluding chemical products from patent protection
because chemicals exist naturally, and, therefore, are merely discov-
ered, not invented.23' The more practical reason given for denying
protection in this area is that industry in these nations is still too
primative to warrant patent protection; it is said to be in the nations'
best public interest to import these products instead of encouraging
their domestic production. 232
Although the modern trend favors removal of restrictions on the
patentability of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and foods, 233 it might be
unwise to bring these areas unconditionally under patent protection
in an international patent agreement. In nations that still restrict
patentability, coverage by an international agreement could throw
the affected industries into disarray. These industries would sud-
denly be forced to seek patents for their products and to compete in
technology rather than price.234 The difficulties arising from these
changes might discourage nations from ratifying the international
227. This approach has been followed by the United States since the initial enactment
of its national patent laws in 1790. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, § 6.01, at 6-2.
228. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
229. For example, mental processes have been exempted from patent protection by
judicial interpretation. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 6.02(3), at 6-28.3. Similarly,
the EPC excludes "schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts" from its
definition of patentable inventions. EPC, supra note 36, at art. 52(2)(c), reprinted in 21 J.
SINNoTr, supra note 20, at EPC 22.
230. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SiNNoTT, supra note 11, at 64.
231. Godenhielm, supra note 73, at 11.
232. Id
233. For example, the EPC allows patents for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and foods,
but it permits contracting nations to make a reservation to this provision. Several signa-
tory nations previously denied patents in these areas, but only Austria has elected to use
the available reservation. Haertel & Singer, supra note 78, at 279. Denmark and Nor-
way also previously failed to extend protection to these inventions, but as proposed in the
Scandanavian uniform law, Lewin, supra note 78, at 22, have now amended their laws to
provide such patent protection. See, e.g., The Consolidated Patents Act, § 1(3) (Den-
mark), reprinted in 2C J. SINNOTr, supra note 20, at Denmark 25.
234. See supra note 3.
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patent agreement. 235
If the treaty offers a reservation on the patentability of chemi-
cals, pharmaceuticals, and foods, nations preferring to restrict pat-
entability on these items are more apt to sign and adhere to it. A
treaty including such a reservation would not change the current
level of international patentable subject matter; those nations pres-
ently granting patent protection for these substances would continue
to do so under the agreement, and those currently denying protec-
tion would subscribe to the reservation. An inventor desiring an
international patent for a new chemical, pharmaceutical, or food
would be permitted to designate as targets only those nations not
subscribing to the reservation.
3. Scope of Monopoly Under Process Patents
A valid patent grants an inventor certain monopoly rights. A
product patent may confer the exclusive right to use, manufacture,
sell, offer to sell, or import the product. Monopoly rights granted
under a process patent may include an exclusive right to use the pro-
cess, as well as any of the other exclusive rights regarding products
resulting from the process. Every nation, however, confers a differ-
ent bundle of monopoly rights. One major variation involves pat-
ents for processes. Some nations only grant an exclusive right to use
the process; 236 other nations also grant an exclusive right to sell and
import products resulting from use of the process. 237 This distinction
becomes particularly important when a third party uses the process
outside the grantor nation's boundaries and attempts to sell the
resulting products within its boundaries. A national patent confer-
ring monopoly rights over only the process would permit third party
importation and sale. A national patent conferring exclusive rights
over both the process and resulting products would prohibit these
third party transactions.
235. Cf. Lewin, supra note 78, at 22. (Because the industrial sectors of Denmark and
Norway objected to provisions of the proposed Nordic patent system, these provisions
never entered into force, eliminating the possibility that the Scandanavian Patent Con-
vention would become effective).
236. See, e.g., New Patent and Trademark Law in Mexico art. 37 (1976), reprinted in
2F J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Mexico 8 (A patent does not entitle the inventor to
import either the patented product or a product manufactured through use of the pat-
ented process).
237. See, e.g., Austrian Patent Act 1977, § 22, reprinted in 2B J. SINNOTT, supra note
20, at Austria 16 ("[Tlhe patentee alone is entitled to produce the subject matter of the
invention industrially, to place it on the market, to offer it for sale or to make use of it.");
Law on the Protection of Inventions by Patents (No. II of 1969), art. 11 (Hungary),
reprinted in 2D J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Hungary 5 ("The exclusive right of working
shall include systematic manufacture and exploitation as well as putting the subject of
the invention on the market within the framework of economic activity.").
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An international patent agreement that incorporates an
accepted formulation of the exclusive rights to be granted under a
patent would achieve greatest uniformity. If nations cannot agree on
such a formulation, however, partial unification could be achieved
through the use of legal alternatives. Participating nations could
select one set of exclusive rights to be granted for product patents.
Process patents would grant inventors only the exclusive right to use
the process within the designated target nations. The treaty would
then provide member nations with the option of also granting exclu-
sive rights over products manufactured through the use of the pro-
cess. In nations choosing the latter alternative, the patentee would
receive the same bundle of rights granted under a pure product pat-
ent. Thus, only two variations would exist in this area of substantive
patent law and member nations would have to deal with only mini-
mal divergence from their present laws.
4. Contributory Infringement
A patent grants an inventor a bundle of exclusive rights that
allows him to exploit his invention. An inventor has an infringement
claim against any person who interferes with these rights.238 In cer-
tain circumstances, however, a person may aid in or help effect
infringement of a patent without subjecting himself to liability. For
example, a person supplying a machine part essential to the opera-
tion of a patented invention, though not an infringer himself, may be
a contributory infringer of that patent.239
Nations have not demonstrated a uniform approach to the
problem of contributory infringement. Some nations do not specifi-
cally address the problem in their patent laws.240 Those nations that
do recognize contributory infringement generally proscribe supply-
ing the means to produce a patented invention and/or inducing
infringement, 241 but apply different standards to the actor's mental
state, as well as to the requisite importance of the supplied means to
the actual operation of the invention.242 In those nations that do not
recognize the offense of contributory infringement, it is likely that
238. Eg., 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1976).
239. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 181. Contributory infringement is
also referred to as indirect infringement.
240. Nations recognizing the doctrine of contributory infringement include Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id Nations that do
not apply the doctrine include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bophuthat-
swana, Brazil, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, Malawi, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Rhodesia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Spain, Transkei, and Zambia. Id at 182.4.
241. See id at 181-82.4 (a survey of the contributory infringement laws of selected
foreign nations).
242. See id.
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the law dealing with accomplice liability covers serious infringement
cases.
243
Legal alternatives may be used to achieve partial unification in
the area of contributory infringement. Nonrecognition of contribu-
tory infringement may be such an integral aspect of a patent law
system that a nation would rather forego adoption of the treaty than
change its law to include such an offense. For nations already recog-
nizing the offense, however, a change in the prescribed mental state
or character of the act in question would more likely be acceptable.
A treaty provision on contributory infringement should give
contracting nations the option of applying the doctrine within their
borders. Those nations choosing to apply the doctrine would be
required to adopt a single uniform definition of contributory
infringement. Thus, although an international patent holder would
be able to enjoin contributory infringement only in those nations
choosing to recognize the doctrine, a single proceeding would resolve
all factual questions concerning the alleged infringement. The pat-
entee would benefit from this partial unification, while signatory
nations would have the option of adopting a provision in closekeep-
ing with their existing national patent law.
5. Compulsory Licensing
Because some patented ideas and inventions uniquely benefit
society, all nations require inventors to license their patents to inter-
ested parties under certain circumstances. A patentee planning
worldwide marketing operations must take into account the
nonuniform circumstances under which various nations require a
compulsory license. Generally, the circumstances that mandate
compulsory licenses can be divided into three categories: an inven-
tor fails to work his patent; the nation maintains a strong interest in
the subject matter of the patent; and holders of dependent patents
require a license to work their own patents. 244
a. Nonworking
Under one view of the nature of a patent system, a patent repre-
243. See id at 182.4-82.6 (a survey of the contributory infringement treatment in
selected foreign nations that do not specifically recognize the docirine).
244. The CPC uses this classification to divide the circumstances expressly requiring
compulsory licensing. See CPC, supra note 39, arts. 46-48, reprinted in 2J . SINNOTr,
supra note 20, at Common Market 36-38. See also Note, Is a Compulsory Patent Licens-
ing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experience, 7 L. & POL. INT'L
Bus. 1207, 1212-18 (1975) (A general discussion of the purposes and effects of compul-
sory licensing).
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sents a contract between an inventor and the state.245 A nation
grants an inventor monopoly rights to his invention in return for the
inventor's promise to exploit his invention for the ultimate benefit of
the public. As a condition of the patent, most nations require a pat-
entee to "work" the patent within that nation by the end of a certain
grace period.246 Some nations, including the United States, rely only
on economic incentives to encourage working.247
Those nations that require working of a patent may impose the
sanction of compulsory licensing for insufficient working.248 These
nations, however, entertain different standards regarding the defini-
tion of "working." 249 Some nations allow a patentee to satisfy the
working requirement by importing the patented product,250 working
the patent in another specified nation, 25' or publicly offering to
license the patent.25 2 Other nations, however, require actual produc-
tion within the nation at a level sufficient to meet market demand.253
Nations subscribing to the Paris Convention cannot require compul-
sory licensing when the inventor has a legitimate reason for non-
working.254 The period of time in which a patentee must begin to
work his patent also varies among different nations. Paris Conven-
245. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 1.02, at 1-4 to 1-5. This view is accepted by the
majority of the United States Courts. Id
246. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 117. This requirement is usually
prescribed by statute. Kunz-Hallstein, The Revision of the International System of Patent
Protection in the Interest of Developing Countries, 10 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT L. 649, 652-53 (1979). See also 2 J. BAXTER, supra note 11, at 118-20 (a listing of
the different grace periods allowed by foreign nations before imposition of sanctions for
non-working).
247. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 118. Other nations that do not
prescribe penalties for nonworking include: Albania, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize,
Chile, Fiji, Haiti, Jamaica, Mauritius, El Salvador, Somalia, South West Africa, the
U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and Western Samoa. Id
248. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1949, ch. 87 §§ 37-38 (Great Britain), reprinted in 2D J.
SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Great Britain 41-44. Great Britain also prescribes revocation
and automatic lapsing of a patent for nonworking. Id
249. Cf I S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS § 17, at 25-26
(1975) (Discussion of the working requirements in a selection of foreign nations).
250. See, e.g., The Patent Law and the Enforcement Law Thereof, art. 2.3(1) (Japan)
(1959), reprinted in 2E J. SINNoTr, supra note 20, at Japan 2. Importation of the patented
product satisfies the working requirement in Bulgaria, Cuba, Greece, Hungary, Japan,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 121.
251. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 1I, at 121. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Honduras, Libya, Switzerland, and Tangier permit the working of a pat-
ent in certain other nations to satisfy the national working requirement.
252. Id. at 122. This offer, known as nominal working, will satisfy the working
requirements in the following nations: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Dominican
Republic, Ireland, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Romania, Spain, Syria, and Turkey. Id
253. See, e.g., Law 2527/1920 for Patents of Invention, art. 16.1(b) (Greece), reprinted
in 2D J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Greece 9.
254. An application for a compulsory license "shall be refused if the patentee justifies
his inaction by legitimate reasons." Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5A(4),
reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Conv. of Paris 47-48.
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tion nations cannot require compulsory licensing until at least three
years after the date of patent grant or four years after the date of
application, whichever is later.255 Some nations that do not sub-
scribe to the Paris Convention permit no grace period at all.256
b. Special State or Public Interest in Subject Matter
Some nations provide for compulsory licensing when the nation
or its residents have a special interest in the subject matter of the
patent.257 Several nations prescribe compulsory licenses only when
the patent concerns foods and medicines. 258 The policy underlying
such a provision is that these goods must be "available to the public
at the lowest possible prices consistent with the patentee deriving a
reasonable advantage from his patent rights. ' 259 Other nations have
similar provisions regarding any patents that are important to the
broader needs of public health or national development.260 The
United States limits compulsory licensing to certain narrow circum-
stances related to the public welfare.261
c. Dependent patents
Most patented inventions are merely improvements over prior
art.262 Thus, to produce a patented invention, a patentee may
require a license under a previously issued patent. To facilitate the
working of a patent, some nations require that holders of parent and
improvement patents cross-license these patents in certain uniformly
accepted circumstances. 263 Nations that do not require working of a
255. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5A(4), reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTr, supra
note 20, at Cony. of Paris 10. The developing nations have proposed an amendment to
the Paris Convention that would reduce this grace period to two years. This amendment
is presently under consideration. See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 246, at 662 n.48: see
generally Haar, Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of Public and Private
Interests in the International Patent System, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77 (1982) (a discus-
sion of attempted revisions to Art. 5A of the Paris Convention).
256. See 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 118.
257. See, e.g., The Patents Act, 1970, § 97 (India), reprinted in 2D J. SINNOr, supra
note 20, at India 58.
258. See, e.g., Law 2527/1920 for Patents of Invention, art. 16.3(b) (Greece), reprinted
in 2D J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Greece 9-10.
259. 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra note 11, at 130.
260. See, e.g., Ministry of Economic Developments, Decree No. 1190 art. 39 (1978)
(Colombia), reprinted in 2C J. SINNOr, supra note 20, at Colombia 13.
261. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (1976) (patents relating to nuclear materials or atomic
energy); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. IV 1980) (patents relating to technology needed to meet
emission control standards). See generally Note, supra note 244, at 1223-31 (discussion
of the United States experience with compulsory licensing).
262. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at § 1.03, at 1-11.
263. Greek patent law, for example, mandates cross-licensing where: (1) the improve-
ment patent cannot be worked without using an earlier patented invention; and (2) the
improvement has "real industrial value." Law 2527/1920 for Patents of Invention, art.
13 (Greece), reprinted in 2D J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Greece 7, 8.
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patent usually do not require cross-licensing of dependent patents.264
National laws on compulsory licensing are too varied to attempt
their complete unification in an international patent treaty. Many
nations that have working requirements, for example, view patents
as devices for obtaining technology from other nations.265 Those
nations that impose no working requirements view patents mainly as
an economic incentive for invention.266 These two views represent
fundamentally different beliefs regarding the role of patents, and it is
unlikely that any nation would change its compulsory licensing law
to adopt the alternative view. 267
Partial unification of compulsory licensing laws could be
achieved, however, in the following manner. First, a treaty should
allow contracting nations to require patent licences in certain nar-
rowly defined subject areas that implicate public policy concerns.268
Such areas might include devices for control of automobile emis-
sions and safety devices for nuclear reactors. To minimize the
treaty's interference with non-patent policies, the choice of these
areas should be left to the subscribing nations.
264. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980 & Supp. V 1981) (no requirement
of working or of cross-licensing); Law for Regulating the Service of Industrial Property,
Decree - Law No. 588, arts. 1-44, reprinted in 2C J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at Chile 2-18.
But see The Patent Act, art. 28 (Jamaica), reprinted in 2E J. SINNOTT, supra note 20, at
Jamaica 12 (application for cross-licensing available to holder of improvement patent,
despite absence of any requirement that patentees work their patents).
265. Beier, supra note 3, at 564.
A working requirement encourages any of three practices on the part of a patentee: he
may actually use the patented invention in the nation; he may license it to someone in the
nation; or, if it satisfies the nation's working requirement, he may import the patented
product into the nation. Greif, The Role of Patent Protected Imports in the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries, 10 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 123,
125-26 (1979). At least the second of these practices transfers technology into the nation
because:
(a) it provides a means of evaluating the subject matter of the license which
unpatented technology may not provide, because it is generally secret;
(b) it ensures to the licensee the exclusivity of the right to make and sell the
subject matter of the patent which is not ensured by know-how alone;
(c) it enables the licensee to obtain simultaneously with the patent license also
the communication of unpatented know-how.
3 S. LADAS, supra note 249, at 1886.
266. See supra note 2.
267. By proposing a series of amendments, developing nations are seeking to liber-
alize the Paris Convention restrictions on compulsory licensing. See supra note 255. The
United States, however, has recently rejected similar attempts to liberalize its own com-
pulsory licensing law. In 1973, Congress considered bills that would have required com-
pulsory licensing of certain technological areas to ensure the public access to
technological developments concerning public health and safety. These bills were never
enacted. See Note, supra note 244, at 1224.
268. The CPC incorporates this approach by specifically allowing compulsory licens-
ing in areas of public interest. See CPC, supra note 39, reprinted in 2J J. SINNOrT, supra
note 20, at Common Market 37.
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Second, a treaty should provide three alternatives regarding the
standards for compulsory licensing of inventions in other subject
areas. Each nation should be able to choose either (1) no compul-
sory licensing within its territory; (2) compulsory licensing only
when certain broadly defined national interests enumerated within
the treaty are implicated; or (3) compulsory licensing whenever there
is insufficient working of a patent or the national interests enumer-
ated under option (2) are implicated. The national interests referred
to in alternatives (2) and (3) may include national health, welfare, or
security. The treaty should require, however, that a nation can grant
a compulsory license on this ground only after a national decision-
making body decides that the public interest in gaining access to the
invention is weightier than the inventor's interest in maintaining his
monopoly.269 Under alternative (3), the treaty should include a uni-
form definition of insufficient working, specifically addressing
whether importation or nominal working27 0 will satisfy the working
requirement. No alternative permitting compulsory licensing only
for insufficient working is necessary because no national law cur-
rently allows compulsory licensing solely for this reason. Every
nation that requires licensing for insufficient working also requires
licensing when national health, welfare or security interests are
involved.27 1
Third, the treaty should allow the contracting parties to decide
whether to require cross-licensing of dependent patents. For those
nations choosing to require cross-licensing, the treaty should include
a uniform set of criteria to determine the specific circumstances that
will trigger the licensing requirement. For nations that adhere to the
Paris Convention and choose not to require cross-licensing, depen-
dence on a pre-existing patent would be a legitimate reason, within
the meaning of the Paris Convention, 27 2 for the nonworking of a
patent.
The above framework requires the holder of an international
patent to deal with only a few variations of compulsory licensing
law. The patentee's situation would be substantially improved; he
269. Some national patent laws use this balancing technique. See, e.g., Law 2527/
1920 for Patents of Invention, art. 16.3(b) (Greece), reprinted in 2D J. SINNOTT, supra
note 20, at Greece 9-10 (In determining whether to grant a compulsory license, ensuring
the availability of a pharmaceutical product to the public is balanced against the inven-
tor's interest in receiving fair compensation for his invention).
270. See supra note 252 and accompanying text; 2 J. BAXTER & J. SINNOTT, supra
note 11, at 117-18.
271. Note, supra note 244, at 1218-19.
272. Under the Paris Convention, an application for a compulsory license based on
nonworking of a patent will be denied if the inventor can present a legitimate reason for
nonworking. Paris Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5A, reprinted in 2H J. SINNOTT,
supra note 20, at Cony. of Paris 47-48.
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would no longer have to consider the wide range of compulsory
licensing provisions he previously had to take into account when
individual national patents were obtained. Moreover, under alterna-
tive compulsory licensing provisions available to each signatory,
member nations would not have to adhere to provisions substantially
different from their existing national law.
E. SUMMARY
The above analysis selectively discusses a few of the substantial
areas of patent law that an international patent treaty must
address.2 73 As the analysis demonstrates, no uniform approach can
be used to achieve partial unification of all substantive patent law
areas. Partial unification of different substantive areas, however, can
be achieved through the use of different unification techniques.
Even the widely divergent views that exist in certain substantive law
issues can be accommodated through these techniques without sacri-
ficing the benefits of an international patent treaty.
IV
CONCLUSION
Because of the growing internationality of industry, multina-
tional patent protection is becoming more and more necessary.
Existing methods of obtaining such protection, however, are costly
and inefficient. In addition, the lack of standardization among
national patent laws hampers full exploitation of patent rights.
These problems mandate closer international cooperation.
While complete unification of the international patent system is
probably not possible at this time, the world can take a significant
step in that direction. By considering both the desire of each nation
to retain its own solutions in substantive areas of patent law and
industry's need for consistency in these solutions, a treaty achieving
partial unification should be possible. Various techniques, including
the use of a bifurcated convention, the use of reservations, deference
to pre-existing national law, and the provision of legal alternatives
will aid the drafters in reaching compromise solutions acceptable to
all parties. The resulting patent system will far more effectively
273. This analysis of the substantive areas of patent law is not exhaustive. Other criti-
cal areas an international treaty must address include: criteria for patentability, includ-
ing standards for novelty and non-obviousness; interpretation of the claims in
infringement suits; and national maintenance fees.
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accomplish the goal of technological advancement, ultimately bene-
fitting the general public of all participating nations.
Warren S. Wo/feld
